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**NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES:
U.S. ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONALISM IN THE
INFORMATION AGE**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID R. GRAY
United States Army**

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**LTC DAVID R. GRAY
United States Army**

**DR. Conrad Crane
Project Adviser**

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**U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17013**

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC David R. Gray

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As the Indian Wars ended in the last decades of the Nineteenth Century, the U. S. Army experienced an identity crisis, sought out a new *raison d'être*, and transformed itself to meet new responsibilities. Calling for internal reforms to adapt to a new century, progressive "Young Turks" conceptualized a fresh role for the Army grounded in perpetual readiness for war. The officer corps implemented a successful transformation process that set the conditions for America's important participation in the First World War. A century later, the Army's *raison d'être* is again in question. Victory in the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated America's major enemy and call the Army's institutional purpose in the New World Order into question. Like its late Nineteenth Century predecessor, the officer corps must again reassess the range of its professional duties and transform itself to meet the 21st Century's evolving strategic conditions. The officer corps will have to establish the institution's intellectual direction and manage associated cultural changes. By adopting a fusionist perspective of professionalism, the officer corps can best broaden the dimensions of its martial expertise, renew its professional identity, and enhance its political effectiveness with civilian leaders.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES: US ARMY PROFESSIONALISM IN THE INFORMATION AGE.....	1
MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE.....	2
OFFICER PROFESSIONALISM IN AN AGE OF MILITARY INDETERMINACY.....	7
POLITICAL SAVVY AND EFFECTIVENESS.....	13
NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES.....	19
ENDNOTES.....	25
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	31

NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES: U.S. ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONALISM IN THE INFORMATION AGE

I now regard the Indians as substantially eliminated from the problems of the Army . . . such Indian wars as have hitherto disturbed the public peace and tranquility are not probable.

—LTG William T. Sherman
Commanding General, US Army
(1883)ⁱ

The war with Spain . . . procured us a prominent place among the nations . . . [and] although we abstain from calling ourselves as such we are virtually one of the Great Powers and one of the greatest of them. With our new position there has descended on our shoulders a heavy burden resting on all Great Powers, of assisting in the regulating and shaping of human affairs. From the moral and intellectual view no nation is better qualified for such a task.

—Captain Carl Reichman,
USA (1906)ⁱⁱ

In the quarter century separating Sherman's and Reichman's observations, the U. S. Army experienced an identity crisis, sought out a new *raison d'être*, and transformed itself to meet new responsibilities. Even before organized hostilities on the frontier came to a close, thoughtful officers were already considering the Army's future mission and role in society. The scale and complexities of the Civil War had profoundly affected the outlook of a significant portion of the officer corps. Mindful also of the sweeping changes in modern weaponry and improved military command methods in Europe, broad-minded officers anxiously watched as warfare grew progressively more complicated. Most concluded that only an officer corps of professional soldiers, not frontier policemen, could master modern war. Calling for internal reforms to adapt to a new century, progressive "Young Turks" conceptualized a fresh role for the Army.

An increasingly professionalized officer corps conceived the Army's mission to be one of perpetual readiness for war. The institution would now serve as a "school" to teach soldiers how to fight and win future wars. Spurred by institutional in-fighting, technological developments, and international concerns, the Army improved its troops' living conditions, reconfigured its organization, acquired modern equipment, and developed new operational concepts. Officer reformers argued that modern warfare required a lifetime of study and pressed for an extensive system of military post-graduate education. Establishment of such a system contributed to a "renaissance" in military thinking in the 1870's and 1880's that redefined officership. Despite its continued performance of constabulary duties, the officer corps' stress on readiness for war profoundly altered institutional culture, enabling the Army to change in form and character. Acquisition of an overseas empire paved the way for further reforms to forge an

Army that could advance national interests abroad. Additional improvements, including the creation of a General Staff and recognition of the National Guard as the nation's primary military reserve, continued a successful transformation process and set the conditions for America's important participation in the First World War.³

A century later, the Army's *raison d'être* is again in question. Victorious in two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, the Army spent the next forty years deterring and containing communist expansionism during the Cold War. The officer corps' professional ethos founded on readiness for war served the Army well during this period as containment involved fighting several "hot," but limited wars. However, strategic conditions at the twentieth century's end require the Army to adjust to fundamentally different circumstances. Victory in the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the West's major enemy and call the Army's institutional purpose in the "New World Order" into question. That these events coincided with a period of domestic cultural upheaval and dramatic technological innovation has further confounded the Army's efforts to redefine its relevancy. In the post-Cold War era, it has performed a wide-range of missions, most not involving combat, in support of the activist national security strategy. Like its late nineteenth century predecessor, the Army's officer corps must again reassess the range of its professional duties and transform itself to meet the new century's evolving socio-political-strategic conditions.

Besides acquisition of new equipment and organizational restructuring, the Army must adjust its institutional military culture for the current transformation process. Just as it did during the military renaissance of the late nineteenth century, the officer corps will have to establish the institution's intellectual direction and manage associated cultural changes. Today's societal norms, the rapid pace of technological change, and a complex strategic environment are already influencing Army culture significantly. The character of the Information Age, like the industrial age that preceded it, requires the officer corps to extend its corporate outlook from the military technicism of the Cold War to a more holistic view of professionalism. By adopting a fusionist perspective of professionalism, the officer corps can best broaden the dimensions of its martial expertise, renew its professional identity, and enhance its political effectiveness with civilian leaders in the Twenty-first century.

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

Military professionalism and military culture are inseparably intertwined. A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with distinctive characteristics. Special expertise acquired through theoretical study and actual practice, the application of that abstract knowledge to

distinct problems, the memberships' identification with the job as a life-long calling, and the primacy of the clients' needs distinguish the professions. Moreover, societies grant professions relative autonomy to determine recruitment, performance, and ethical standards. Military professionalism refers primarily to the officer corps. That collective body possesses professional status because of its responsibilities and accountability to the nation's leadership for military effectiveness.⁴ The chief function of the profession of arms is the application and management of organized, socially sanctioned force in pursuit of the nation's interests. Combat and success in battle are the profession's main concerns. Unique to the military profession is the willingness to sacrifice life and limb in the service of the state.⁵

The singular requirements of military professionalism shape an armed force's organizational culture. Culture refers to the nexus of attitudes, norms, values, customs, beliefs, and education that produce a group's collective sense of identity. Culture involves both ideas and behavior; it establishes the group's world-view as well as its normative behavior for responding to particular problems. In short, culture is the "glue" that consistently binds an organization together despite changes in leadership.⁶ Warfighting, the military's core competency, defines its culture. That culture shapes the context of professional soldiers' understanding of warfare in all of its manifold dimensions. The ethos of traditional military professionalism is embodied in the virtues of physical courage, self-denial, self-sacrifice, obedience, and discipline.⁷ Its icons are those of the masculine warrior -- the infantryman, paratrooper, or tank crewman, for example -- who personifies the martial ethos. Structured in hierarchies to facilitate unity of command and mission achievement, military societies are undemocratic and stress the value of the group over individual desires. Sir John Hackett, a former commander of the British Army of the Rhine, has succinctly summed up the essence of military culture, writing:

The essential basis of military life is ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability that sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will (or should) always be a citizen; as long as he serves he will never be a civilian.⁸

Although the military profession -- and by extension the Army -- possess distinctive characteristics from civilian society, the state it serves shapes its organization, purpose, and behavior. Unique geographical, social, ideological, and technological factors also contribute to a nation's consensual image of war.⁹ This image of war, or strategic culture, profoundly influences the status of military professionalism in society and conditions its martial behavior. The United States' liberal political ideology, pluralistic military institutions, absolutist conception

of national security, penchant for material solutions to problems – especially technological ones, and geographical isolation are the basis for the American way of war. That strategic culture has molded the Army's core tasks and organizational focus.

Not surprisingly, American ideology and political culture have forged the nation's attitude toward military institutions and the use of force. Founded on the idea of natural rights, American culture emphasizes liberty, individualism, capitalism, and distrust of centralized power. The latter point especially underscores fear of charismatic military "men on horseback" and standing armies, which represent tyrannical threats to civil liberties. To balance national security needs with individual freedoms, the Republic's Founding Fathers enshrined the concept of civilian supremacy over military forces in law. Constitutional provisions split responsibility for military command, organization, and oversight between the President and Congress. The Constitution also established a dual army composed of regulars and militia; this concept provided for immediate security needs, while ensuring the nation's citizens' had a stake in the outcome of its wars. These pluralistic institutions provided socially acceptable means to achieve the Constitution's stated purposes to "insure domestic tranquility" and "provide for the common defense" against external threats.¹⁰

Grounded in classic liberal tradition, American society regards peace and war as diametrical opposites. War is an aberration, a breakdown in otherwise peaceful relations between states. Appealing to the unique destiny of the United States to spread its democratic ideals, American political leaders often cast conflicts as ideological crusades to mobilize popular support. During war America seeks clear-cut victory at the lowest cost through the application of massive military force to restore normalcy. American armed forces rely on the nation's material might and technology to overwhelm the enemy, while minimizing their own casualties.¹¹

Besides ideology, geography has also shaped the American way of war. Isolated by two oceans and bordered by two friendly nation-states, the United States enjoys relative freedom from external invasion, reducing the need for conventional defenses of its territory. Conversely, that same geography makes projection of land power especially difficult. The expeditionary nature of American power projection requires a high-degree of inter-service cooperation, which is often marred by institutional rivalries. Moreover, America's geographical position ensures that land power is dependent upon both sea and air power just to get its legions to overseas battlefields. Knowledge and understanding of joint operations is, therefore, a fundamental element of professional military expertise.

These ideals and material factors had important consequences for the development of military professionalism in the Army. First, from the earliest of days of the Republic an acute

tension has existed between the ideals of liberalism and the traditional military values of subordination, discipline, and obedience to a hierarchical chain of command. While inculcating military virtues, the professional socialization process dampens, but does not completely eliminate the tension. Second, the officer corps responded to the nation's historical distrust of government power, especially in the military form, by adopting over time the principle, if not entirely the practice, of military non-interference in political matters. The roles of officer and politician were distinct; officers offered advice to civilians only on military matters not political issues. This tradition reinforced the notion that peace and war were separate spheres governed by independent rules and with different overseers. Third, the conceptual isolation of politics and military operations created a military preference for absolute solutions to external security problems. This absolutist approach expressed itself in the officer corps' affinity for total victories as expressed by Grant's unconditional surrender demands in the Civil War or the destruction of Indian tribes blocking westward expansion.

The officer corps' conception of warfare is congruent with the nation's strategic culture and the Army's historical experience. The belief that the international system will largely remain the same underlies all assumptions regarding war. The Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states will continue to compete in an anarchic world dominated by national self-interests and where armed combat serves as an instrument of policy. The use of force remains the exclusive province of regular military establishments directed by an officer elite and governed by rules and customs. When engaged in war, America will interpret national objectives in absolute terms by seeking the complete overthrow of its opponents' capacity to resist. American armed forces, therefore, prefer strategies of annihilation to destroy an enemy's military capabilities as the quickest means toward achieving victory. Towards this end, the Army aims to overwhelm the enemy by applying decisive force -- the combination of massed effects, material overmatch, and sophisticated weaponry. Optimism that force of American arms can achieve ultimate victory in war underpins the officer corps' professional self-esteem.¹² This "absolutist" perspective, entrenched in a pessimistic belief in the permanency of war and stress on military victory, has consistently dominated the Army's military culture.¹³

The increasing professionalism of the Army's officer corps set in motion during the dark days of constabulary duty on the Western frontiers paid dividends during the Twentieth Century. In two World Wars, professionals organized, equipped, and deployed immense armies composed of citizen soldiers to overseas theaters. The professionals then led their citizen soldiers to clear-cut military victories. Cooperative civil-military relations reached their zenith

during World War II with General George C Marshall serving as the model of professional selfless service.

The Cold War, however, challenged the high state of military professionalism achieved by 1945. Paradoxically, the Cold War's increasing militarization of American society coincided with the declining credibility of the officer corps' claim to sole expertise in employing military force. The nation's reliance on a strategy of nuclear deterrence, the prominent rise of civilian defense intellectuals in policy circles, and the limited wars in Korea and Vietnam undermined the officer corps' professional ethos and invoked resistance to wars without military victory. The possibility of nuclear Armageddon – an absolute war so terrible that it threatened to make traditional notions of war obsolete -- struck at the underpinnings of military professionalism. The nuclear age restricted traditional military practice to a narrow spectrum of conflicts without clear distinctions between war and politics. It certainly ended the possibility of achieving an unconditional surrender. The new era of limited war frustrated the Army officer corps, who chaffed at restrictions on waging decisive land warfare.¹⁴

Following a bitter defeat in Vietnam, the Army officer corps reformed the institution, restoring traditional focus on conventional war against a major power, in this case against the Soviet Union in Europe. The rigorous emphasis placed on officer professionalism during the 1970's and 1980's restored morale and increased martial expertise.¹⁵ The efforts seemed well placed as the Cold War ended in a bloodless victory with the complete collapse of the enemy's country. The decisive use of force in Panama and Iraq reinforced the notion that the officer corps had achieved a level of competent professionalism not seen since World War II. Once again professional and civilian conceptions of how to fight a war converged and established the vision for future conflicts – civilians setting clear policy goals and the military using overwhelming force, founded on the nation's technological advantages, to achieve discernible results. This image of future war resembled, as one scholar has asserted, "a reprise of World War II in the fancy dress of high technology."¹⁶ But the New World Order has proved different than imagined. Changes in America's social norms, technological innovations, and evolving global geo-political commitments call for professional reappraisal of the military art for the new age.

As it crafts the future direction of the profession, the officer corps must recognize the effect of these changes on its distinctive ethos and culture. Out of habit, the officer corps will routinely choose operational responses consistent with American strategic culture and traditional military practices. But the new era will require adaptation and rethinking of some traditional concepts to meet fully America's evolving security requirements. Although readiness

for war must remain its central defining feature, officer professionalism in the Twenty-first century must adopt a corporate view that is more fusionist in perspective. Fusionism emphasizes expertise in technical military matters but also consideration of the potential impact of political, economic, technological, and social factors on military operations.¹⁷ A fusionist officer corps will be better able to reconcile the distinctiveness of soldier's calling with changing social norms, to broaden the scope of military expertise to meet complex security demands, and to enhance their credibility with civilian leaders by providing realistic advice on national security matters.

OFFICER PROFESSIONALISM IN AN AGE OF MILITARY INDETERMINACY

Adapting to the challenges of the new century is as daunting a task for today's officer corps as it was for Army professionals a century ago. Like their predecessors, officers anxiously prepare for the future in a period of change characterized by the military's declining importance in society and indeterminate threats to security. Assimilating postmodernist ideology and the effects of sophisticated technologies, American society is in a period of social transition as sweeping in impact as occurred during last century's reshaping of life by the industrial revolution. Military concerns, largely preeminent in the Cold War, have begun to slip into the background of social and political discourse, except perhaps for debates regarding the military's slowness to adopt prevailing cultural norms. Externally, the United States faces no military powers capable of threatening its sovereignty or survival except through all-out nuclear attack. A number of lesser perils, however, jeopardize the relative peace. Because the United States has assumed the role as enforcer of global stability, the American military must be capable of operating in a broad range of circumstances often perceived as incongruent with the traditional professional ethos. These changing dynamics have blurred lines between civilian and military expertise and called into question the Army's self-identity and need to perform close combat, its defining competency.

Postmodernist cultural mores contradict the corporate norms the Army historically has needed to wage sustained land warfare and engage in close combat. Army culture identifies team effort to achieve success in battle; discipline, obedience, and loyalty to a hierarchical chain of command as the essential military virtues. In postmodernist culture all values are subject to interpretation, truth is relative, and relationships to institutions, especially governmental ones, are suspect. Ironically, as America honors the collective sacrifices of the "Greatest Generation" during World War II, postmodern models for behavior prize assertive individualism, portable loyalty, and self-actualization. Diversity and self-affirmation are the corner stones of the culture.

Moreover, the melting away of long-held societal taboos associated with gender and sexual orientation in postmodern society have affected the essence of military life. The masculine nature of military culture, resting on men's physical prowess and singular role as fighters, has evolved with the opening of more career fields to women. After acrimonious public confrontation over the issue of homosexuals in the military and a series of sex scandals, the Army adopted compromise measures to combat abuses and make its culture more open to prevailing social mores.¹⁸ The very character of postmodern culture, therefore, undermines traditional aspects of the professional ethos and corporate cohesion.¹⁹

Changing social mores have coincided with massive technological advances, which have also caused the Army to examine the way it will fight in the Information Age. According to the prevailing view in academic and security studies circles, the world has entered a dramatically different era of warfare. The sheer momentum of technological progress, especially the rapid spread of computer-based information systems, has sparked a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The scope and character of this RMA varies according to the source consulted; however, the Army has accepted many of the basic premises in crafting its vision of future warfare.²⁰

Central to its transformation efforts is the Army's belief that information technologies will play the major role in shaping the conduct of future land combat. Speed and knowledge are the fundamental features of warfare in the Information Age.²¹ Swift advances in information technologies will provide forces with better situational awareness, both of the enemy's and one's own location on the battlefield. Superior battlefield awareness allows small, mobile units to control greater areas. On the non-linear battlefields of the future, more modular combined arms teams will employ precision munitions at greater ranges with exacting accuracy. Moreover, information superiority will enable friendly forces to reduce their vulnerability through dispersion, to make decisions more rapidly than the enemy, and to operate at faster tempo. Precision strikes, rapid maneuver, and simultaneous assaults will overwhelm opponents before they can react. Flatter, more "networked" fighting forces are more effective than "hierarchical organizations that are large, slow and non-stealthy" in this style of warfare.²² By stressing conventional warfare between opposing armies and use of high technology to overcome enemies in rapid, decisive operations, this vision of future warfare coincides closely with the traditional American way of war.

Postmodern mores and technological imperatives together have profound implications for the military profession. First, the officer corps will continue to experience a decreased pool of manpower from which to draw its future leaders. Part of the problem is demographic, a

shrinking base of available military age manpower in the early 2000s, and part economic. What Generation Xers may lack in military virtues, they make up for in technological literacy. Arguably, information technologies further enhance the trend toward individualism by providing access to a wider base of knowledge and increasing personal productivity. The military must compete in an expanding economy dependent on high technology for sustained growth. This economy has produced a huge job market for "dot-com savvy" individuals. Finding the right incentives to attract high-quality, technologically oriented officer candidates willing to subordinate some of their individuality to conform to organizational discipline will be challenging. Indeed, the Army's newest recruiting slogan, "An Army of One" addresses this dynamic by attempting to persuade potential recruits that they will not lose their individual identity upon entry into the organization.²³

Second, the boundaries between combat and non-combat activities have become more indistinct. Are information technicians who use computer code to disrupt power grids, telephone exchanges, or water supplies engaging in or supporting combat? And if this action constitutes "combat," then how can the military profession lay claim to it as part of its special expertise since many civilian computer technicians could perform the same task as effectively? Similarly, the accelerating use of long-range, over the horizon precision munitions to engage targets will redefine the meaning of close combat and potentially realign the dynamics of the Army's professional ethos. The adjustment in professional ethos would likely be more akin to that of bomber pilot or nuclear missileer culture than that of traditional combat arms culture, which willingly accepted killing the enemy within observable range of direct fires as an inherent necessity. The distinctions are important because of the degree of emphasis placed on individual competence rather than demonstrated leadership. If warfare can be reduced to the destruction of a few key targets sets by small teams of warriors rather than the application of organized violence by large operational formations, then military culture would place more value on the former rather than the latter. The opposite is true today. Thus, the interaction of changing cultural mores and acceptance of a technological view of warfare replaces the fighter with the computer "geek" as the icon of military professionalism. And in some cases civilian contractors, like the mercenaries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, may supercede trained soldiers as the practitioners of new age warfare, placing the status and prestige of the military profession at risk.

The postmodern mechanistic view of war, so appealing in its near bloodless, video-game-like qualities, virtually ignores other forms of warfare that American soldiers are likely to face for the foreseeable future. Information war enthusiasts persistently tend to minimize

examples where an opponent's will has overcome technological and organizational superiority. Recent examples abound beginning with Vietnam (which the US Army as an institution steadfastly refuses to examine with any deep intellectual honesty), Afghanistan, Chechnya, as well as the current trouble between the Israelis and Palestinians.²⁴ Technological superiority failed to produce quick, decisive results in any of these conflicts. Human factors played a greater role in determining the outcome as less well-equipped opponents effectively found adaptive means to mitigate the effects of more technologically sophisticated weaponry. Indeed, the most effective strategies employed by a technologically weaker power – the Maoist strategy of people's war and *dau tranh*, the North Vietnamese variant – stress the enduring power of man over machine. The point is that technological advances will not alter the fundamental features of war: fear, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Although mastering the tools of war will remain a fundamental part of military expertise, more crucial will be the rapid comprehension of a war's political context and enemy's approach to fighting, which will likely be very different than described in information war literature.²⁵

Moreover, the officer corps will likely confront wars more akin to Vietnam than Starship Troopers in the coming decades. Arguably, Vietnam represented the first Information Age war. The war contained most of the features now touted as unique to the knowledge-based warfare of the twenty-first century. American forces employed an impressive array of advanced technologies – sophisticated seismic and acoustic sensors, the first generation of air-launched precision-guided missiles, and computers for processing intelligence and battlefield results -- against an elusive enemy. Within one geographically diverse theater of war, American forces fought toe to toe with North Vietnamese Main Forces, engaged Viet Cong insurgents, rebuilt villages as part of pacification efforts, and bombed targets in the North, all in full view of a seemingly ubiquitous media. These activities occurred simultaneously in widely separated areas of responsibility. Determining what kind of war to fight and with what type of forces proved as problematic for small unit commanders as for the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam. The multi-faceted nature of the war considerably stressed the officer corps' intellectual agility to adjust rapidly enough to vastly different types of hostile environments. The complexity of switching between conventional, counter-insurgency, and pacification operations proved especially daunting.²⁶ Vietnam, therefore, provides a glimpse of the type of "full spectrum operations" officers must be prepared to fight in the future.²⁷

Fortunately, the national security strategy of engagement has nudged, if not forced, military professionals to confront troublesome small wars and disparate forms of conflict. The strategy emerged in the heady aftermath of the Cold War, when the United States became not

just one of the Great Powers, but the world's sole Super power. Reacting to sweeping international change and fresh from decisive victories in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, President George Bush adopted "peacetime engagement" as the new American national security strategy in 1991. The strategy focused on prevention rather than reaction. Henceforth, American power would attempt to reduce the "root causes" of conflict through heightened nation assistance, multi-lateral responses to security problems, and, when required, the discriminate application of overwhelming military power to keep the peace.²⁸ Bush first tested the strategy during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia shortly before leaving office. The Clinton Administration clearly accepted the logic and grammar of peacetime engagement. The Clintonian strategy of "engagement and enlargement" held that global stability in the new world order depended upon a vastly different type of military force structure, more innovative military strategies to "shape" the international context, and perhaps even a different type of officer corps than in the Cold War.²⁹

The dynamics of the post-Cold War world and the strategy of peacetime engagement have forced the Army to prepare for high-end conventional combat while simultaneously performing many "military operations other than war." These latter operations included peacekeeping, counter-drug operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief in such diverse locations as Bosnia, Columbia, Haiti, and East Timor. During the 1990's, operations other than war became routine, causing military leaders to pay greater sensitivity to political, economic, and cultural factors than they might have during combat operations against a clearly defined enemy. Acting directly in concert with a number of governmental agencies, allied and host nation forces, media contingents, and civilian non-governmental agencies has further complicated military planning and execution. The ambiguous nature of operations other than war has produced some frustration and grumbling in professional military ranks. Reflecting traditional concerns about appropriate military roles, many complain that such tasks are non-traditional, improper, and detrimental to combat readiness.

Peacetime engagement has created two vexing conundrums for the military profession. First, the officer corps has resisted using military force for many of the past decades' humanitarian interventions because they appeared antithetical to its preferred operational style and strategic culture. After the devastating firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1992, the military chaffed against so-called humanitarian interventions that lacked clear-cut objectives and applied force discretely but not necessarily decisively. For an officer corps that identified with heroic leadership in conventional battles, peace operations seemed too much like police work that sapped the combat ethos. Many officers worried that prolonged participation in peace

operations would damage the warrior ethic necessary for success in combat.³⁰ Restrictive rules of engagement and political pressures (real and perceived) to avoid casualties undermined the professional ethos of sacrifice and unlimited liability. That over-emphasis on force protection was having a pernicious effect on the profession was apparent as commanders told subordinates that "there was nothing worth dying for in Bosnia."³¹ Reluctance to carry out missions that do not comply with the military's preferred operational style may have undermined the credibility of military advice with civilian leaders, as the acrimonious exchange between Colin Powell and Madeline Albright over the Bosnia intervention seemed to indicate.³²

Peacetime engagement also underscored the blurring of traditional boundaries between civilian and military responsibilities. Military officers have become not only practitioners of the military art but agents of diplomacy. At the tactical level, for example, officers of all ranks engaged in negotiations with local civilian leaders, factional military commanders, and members of the international community during peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Because of the national security strategy's emphasis on "shaping" the peacetime environment, geographic commander in chiefs (CINCs) of regional commands have become important emissaries of foreign policy at the strategic and operational levels. Working alongside their region's U. S. Ambassadors, the CINCs increasingly are involved in high level military to military and diplomatic contacts that often develop into personal relationships with key elites in their theaters of operation. These relationships have a major impact on the CINCs' ability to implement portions of their theater engagement plan and to influence events during a crisis. With access to great resources and ability to execute engagement programs, the CINCs' influence in some cases exceeds that of the US Ambassadors to a particular country. A recent *Washington Post* article characterized the CINCs as the "modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's pro-consuls: well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of US foreign policy."³³ The impetus to prevent instability in the regional commands, therefore, often places the CINCs in the forefront of diplomacy, traditionally a State Department function.

The practical effect of peacetime engagement is to push the military professional mind-set away from absolutism toward pragmatism. The success of the CINCs' shaping strategies and military commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo can only be measured in the long-term, not short decisive victories over hostile factions. Some form of engagement will likely remain America's strategy for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the officer corps must understand the subtle distinctions between military power (potential capability) and military force (the product of capability, will, and fighting spirit) as well as to the socio-political dynamics associated with their use. The pragmatic code primarily emphasizes the measured application of force and its

political consequences. Despite the pragmatic code's embodiment of Clausewitzian and fusionist perspectives, many civilian leaders and academics worry that the officer corps' greater sensitivity to political factors is undermining civil-military relations.

POLITICAL SAVVY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Since the late nineteenth century, Army leaders from Sherman to Marshall have emphasized the separation of military from political advice and discouraged active political partisanship. Although the Army's continued performance of constabulary missions prior to World War I required officers to exercise political skills, the preferred professional outlook denigrated politics and "political officers." Officers of Marshall's generation, and Marshall himself, did not even vote lest even the hint that partisan political concerns taint their military advice.³⁴ The professional ethos that helped insulate officers from partisan political matters slowly eroded during the Cold War. Disputes over service roles and missions, inequitable distribution of scarce resources, and evolving global strategy all contributed to civil-military tensions. The tensions simmered within every Administration during the Cold War and often boiled over into public view. The revolt of the Admirals, MacArthur's dismal as Commander in Chief in the Far East, Ridgway's and Taylor's feuds with Eisenhower's New Look policy, and the outright rejection or manipulation of military advice during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations provide just a few examples of deteriorating relations.³⁵ Muted for a short time during the 1980's, the tensions resurfaced shortly after DESERT STORM as the Bush and Clinton Administrations considered the shape of the New World Order.

The military's increasing role in the political matters, especially at the highest policy level, during the 1990's has raised red flags of warning in civilian academia and policy circles. Many fear that, by expanding the scope of military advice into areas traditionally dominated by civilian policy makers, a fusionist officer corps has become overly politicized, seriously jeopardizing civilian control of the military. Critics cite General Colin Powell's behavior as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as proof of corrupted military professionalism that had gone "out of control."³⁶

Powell's shaping of military strategy and public airing of his strong views on military intervention in Bosnia provoked considerable controversy. Viewing the strategic problem within the context of American experiences in Korea and Vietnam, Powell argued: "As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me, 'surgical,' I head for the bushes." "Decisive means and results are to be preferred," the Chairman asserted, "even if they are not always possible."³⁷ Critics lambasted Powell as an

insubordinate and labeled him the new "McClellan."³⁸ That National Command Authorities initially accepted the wisdom of Powell's arguments appeared even more troubling to critics. The Chairman's subsequent directness, candor, and "political maneuverings" in proposing alternatives to President Clinton's plan to lift the ban on homosexuality in the military convinced one noted scholar that "the military is more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history and more vocal about it."³⁹

However, the critics' views ignored the critical role of military advice in policy formulation, recent legislation, and historical traditions in helping to balance civil-military relations. Clausewitz clearly recognized that officers must consider all relevant factors when giving advice to their civilian masters. The Prussian theorist correctly asserts that a "purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging," because "no major proposal required for war [or operations other than war for that matter] can be worked out in ignorance of political factors." To ensure the best coordination and integration, Clausewitz advised governments to appoint the commander in chief to the cabinet where he and his country's political leaders could jointly discuss strategic policies.⁴⁰ Clausewitzian in character, the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization (Goldwater-Nichols) Act legally mandated the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President's "principal military adviser." On all matters relating to the military, Powell, therefore, had a responsibility to make his views and those of the Joint Chiefs known to the President. The law also required the Chairman to present official dissenting views within the Joint Chiefs to air all sides of an issue. The decision to accept or reject the Chairman's advice remains the President's.

Many critics worry that the law has created a too powerful Chairman and a highly adept Prussian-style General Staff skilled at manipulating civilian authorities. This concern overstates the case because the four services' officer corps approach security issues from different cultural perspectives and do not share a homogenous corporate outlook. Besides strong traditions of military subordination to civilian authority, constitutional and administrative barriers continue to prevent the military from gaining too much control over policy making. Moreover, participation in the policy-making process, which involves thorough considerations of ends, ways, and means relationships, is more likely to generate greater loyalty to the nation and enhance, rather than detract from, civilian control of the military.

The role of uniformed officers, especially the top brass and those in strategy or policy planning billets, is primarily to advise civilian political leaders on the armed services' capabilities, limitations, and appropriate uses for military power. Always keeping the human dimension in mind, officers recommend how military means can best achieve policy aims. Strategists, while

serving as the experts in the management of violence, must also consider their recommendations within the overall context of the strategic environment. Since military action can never be taken in isolation from domestic and foreign politics, economic issues, or media coverage, military plans based on "real-world" considerations will carry far greater weight with civilian policy-makers.⁴¹ As former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor once noted "nothing is so likely to repel the civilian decision makers as a military argument which omits obvious considerations which the President cannot omit." If an officer wanted to "persuade the President," Taylor further argued, then he had "better look at the totality of [the President's] problem and try to give maximum help."⁴² Placing military advice within a broader perspective is likely to have more influence with civilian leaders than that confined to essential military aspects.

The last decade's civil-military tensions have chipped away at the Army's political effectiveness. Political effectiveness refers to the ability of the Army's most senior leadership to secure *consistently* the resources required to maintain, expand, and reconstitute itself. To remain viable, the Army requires reliable access to financial support, an adequate military-industrial base, sufficient quantity and quality of manpower, and control over the conversion of resources into actual capabilities. Because decisions regarding the allocation of these resources involve political issues, military leaders must obtain the cooperation of the national political elite. Political effectiveness hinges upon the civilian political leadership's beliefs about military activities. Whether they believe military activity is legitimate and view officership as a profession requiring special expertise determines the credibility and weight of arguments for resources. To what extent that Army leaders can more persuasively articulate their service's needs over those of their competitors provides the measure of political effectiveness.⁴³ Continued questioning of peacekeeping missions, the unveiling of weapons systems deemed more fit for the Cold War than future conflicts, a series of well-publicized sex scandals, and the inability to project rapidly heavy forces to Kosovo all marred the Army's political effectiveness in recent years.

The officer corps has a responsibility to increase its political effectiveness, without which America's Army will suffer from insufficient resources and institutional decline. Civilian leaders routinely ask officers for their expert military advice on a variety of issues. To make the institution's voice heard, officers must develop "political savvy" and participate in "constructive political engagement."⁴⁴ A politically savvy officer corps derives its credibility from proven military skills and impartial advice rooted in the contextual interconnections between politics, policy, and strategy. By offering intellectually sound advice, a politically savvy officer corps can

educate civilian leaders on military perspectives. This requires increased understanding of relationship of military to society and connections between politics and the application of military force.

Realistic political education focused on the role of the military, especially the Army's, in society can address the first relationship. This process must not stop with pre-commissioning courses but be integrated throughout the professional education system. It should start with the fundamental requirement for officers to understand the Constitution and basic civics – the 2000 presidential election shows just how ignorant Americans in general are about their country's basic principles of governance. Although the curriculums at CGSC and the War College address some aspects, field-grade students should study more deeply the connections between the branches of government, both in law-making and national security formulation. Understanding the dynamics of the American legislative process is essential in the policy and budgeting arenas, especially how political compromise and local politics influence the outcome of budgeting, weapons procurement, and base realignment decisions. Without such a background and consideration of the checks and balances in American government, the officer corps will be unable to influence government leaders on military matters.

The second relationship – between politics and war – requires not only theoretical training, but also a reassessment of the meaning and ethics of professional military advice. Currently, the Professional Military Education (PME) system exposes field grade officers to military theory, especially the work of Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz. In *On War*, Clausewitz states that “war is the continuation of policy by other means” and that “war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.” Because “war is a branch of political activity,” Clausewitz further argues that it “cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.”⁴⁵ These statements indicate that officers serving on higher level staffs involved in national security must possess a thorough understanding of the political policy-making process.

Political sophistication does not mean officers can or should become involved in partisan politics. The officer corps cannot remain completely aloof from political issues that affect the profession in an age of intrusive, around the clock media coverage. The very nature of the American political system and the various symbiotic links between the defense industry and government will prevent the officer corps from doing so when expert military advice is needed. The close connection of politics, strategy, and resources make apoliticism, if it ever truly existed, an unobtainable ideal. Indeed, General Powell counseled officers attending National Defense

University to gain a better understanding of politics and the media because “politics is fundamental.” According to the former Chairman, “there isn’t a general in Washington who isn’t political, not if he’s going to be successful, because that is the nature of our system.”⁴⁶ The real civil-military issues involve avoidance of partisan interest group politics and the delineation of what constitutes legitimate dissent with civilian leaders. The line between advice, advocacy, and insistence is fine one that officers must walk carefully. And it is on this very issue that critics have correctly noted a significant change in the professional culture.

A recent comprehensive study of civil-military relations by the Triangle Institute of Strategic Studies found that evolving professional norms contradict traditional understandings of civilian control. The survey indicates that a majority of officers believe it is proper for the military to “insist rather than merely advise (or even advocate in private) on key matters, especially those involving the use of force.” This extends to senior military officers having a role in determining exit strategies, rules of engagement, and force tailoring for the mission. Many officers cite *Dereliction of Duty*, H.R. McMaster’s influential study of civil-military relations in the Johnson Administration during the Vietnam War, as justification for the senior leaders’ right to assert themselves on policy matters. Company and field grade officers also believe that senior officers have a responsibility to resist civilian political pressures and resign in protest if they believe senior civilian authorities to be pursuing reckless policies. According to the survey, nearly half of the mid-level officers said they would resign from service if their senior uniformed leadership [did] not stand up for what is right in military policy.⁴⁷

The troubling rise of civil-military distrust and the discord it has caused in the ranks of the officer corps represent unexpected Cold War legacies on military culture. The conduct of limited wars in Korea and Vietnam soured relations between civilians and the officer corps. The frustrations of those “never again” generations influenced the current crop of officers, who believe they have an obligation to make their voice heard on policy matters to prevent another Vietnam.

Embracing “no more Vietnams,” much of the officer corps has become confused over their professional duties to the state, their sole client. They misconstrue their duty to **voice** professional military advice with the right to **vote** on policy matters. The officer corps does not have any such right to decide national policy, nor can it under the American Constitutional system. A significant number of officers have unthinkingly accepted MacArthur’s wrong-headed notion of civil-military relations. MacArthur objected to:

a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, that members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive

Branch of Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.⁴⁸

MacArthur is right on one point: *his fallacious proposition* inherently endangers the professional ethos. The President is the duly elected representative of the people; his actions as commander in chief have constitutional legitimacy. Sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution, the officer corps cannot legally or ethically pick and choose which policies they will execute. Nor is the notion of mass resignation concerning policy disagreements an ethically permissible option. Rejecting mass resignation as weapon to be used against civilian authorities, George Washington essentially settled the matter at Newburgh, New York in 1783 when he dissuaded dissident officers from marching on Congress or striking.⁴⁹

Rising civil-military tensions clearly underscore the points made above regarding political literacy and the need for enlightened discourse between soldier and civilian. Moreover, the deterioration of the professional ethic requires the officer corps to reexamine the logic of civilian control of the military. "Mid-level officers seem to think we can insist on things in the Oval Office," a senior officer recently complained, "That is not how the system works at that level."⁵⁰ To avoid politicization of its ranks, the officer corps needs to discuss and reconsider its professional responsibilities to the nation. The officer corps' credibility and effectiveness depends upon a clear understanding of proper boundaries between legitimate military advice and politicization of issues.

The Information Age presents several paradoxes for officership in the Twenty-first century. While the technological bent of the Information Age prizes specialization and individual technical skills, their integration and synchronization into a useful system for warfighting demands an officer with a much broader range of generalized knowledge. Mastery of traditional branch technical skills and the moral inspiration of soldiers fighting in chaotic conditions continue to be fundamental areas of officer expertise. Strategic requirements, however, oblige even low-level officers to understand joint and combined operations, as well as diplomacy and the art of negotiation. Conditioned by postmodern individualism and empowered by the ability to communicate instantaneously and with global reach, military subordinates often challenge the moral authority of more senior leaders' decisions, even as obedience and discipline under a chain of command must continue as the basis of effective military professionalism.

Officers at all levels participate in political matters to a much greater degree than in the past. These activities range from negotiating disarmament of ethnic clans at the tactical level to discussions of policy with civilian elites at the strategic level. But how to speak out on matters

affecting the profession of arms without the officer corps becoming politicized remains a tricky issue. The solution lies in reconciling the demands of traditional military culture with the dynamics of the new age. Military effectiveness in the next century will depend upon a professional ethos founded upon the willingness always to fight when required, but selfless service to nation above all.

NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES

On the eve of an impending military revolution, a group of Young Turks in the late nineteenth century set out a series of reforms to improve the Army's military effectiveness in a period of indeterminate security challenges. Their calls for personnel reform and demands for professional education sparked an intellectual renaissance that provided impetus for cultural change. These early efforts paved the way for the Army's increased professionalism in the Twentieth Century. Now a new set of military progressives from all officer ranks must lead, rather than follow, change as the Army prepares to meet the demands of the new age.

The most important challenges for the officer corps in the twenty-first century are intellectual and cultural. First, the officer corps must reassert its traditional authority over matters pertaining to war. Since 1945 and the birth of the atomic age, the officer corps has ceded serious thinking about war to civilian defense intellectuals. During the current strategic pause, the officer corps needs to do some hard thinking about the full spectrum of conflict. The experimentation process begun with the Louisiana Maneuvers, Force XXI, and Army after Next provided laudable first steps. But the work of these groups centered on conventional high tech warfare, the Army's preferred operational style. Theories of future war need to incorporate not only technological possibilities, but also consider the involvement of civilian populations and the strategies that may effectively counter America's use of decisive force. Officers must have the mental flexibility to adjust to rapidly changing conditions, to switch from one form of warfare to another, and to improvise. Mental flexibility remains wedded to practical mastery of branch specific skills in the field and continued study of the profession through formal schooling and individual reflection.

The intellectual and cultural changes necessary for the officer corps to fight America's next wars must begin in the schoolhouse. The Army provides officers with a progressive and comprehensive professional education. The tiered system synchronizes an officer's intellectual growth in line with increasing rank and responsibilities. The system works well as far as it goes. Curriculums at the staff and war colleges, however, need to spend more time seriously considering the meaning of full spectrum warfare, from people's war to urban combat in the high

tech age. The officer corps must do hard thinking about war and be mentally prepared to execute rapid *coup de mains* as well as fight protracted conflicts against determined enemies.

The officer corps must change its cultural attitudes toward education and the desirability of faculty assignments. The Army needs to assign up-and-coming talent to its faculties. The best and brightest should see teaching as career enhancing, not career-ending. During the 1920's and 1930's, the Army's institutional ethos insisted that it was important for officers to go to school and that many of them would serve on school faculties. Omar Bradley taught at West Point and the Infantry School. Jacob Devers also instructed at West Point as well as the Field Artillery School as an instructor. Walter Krueger, Alexander Patch, William Simpson, Joseph McNarny, Charles Bolté, and J. Lawton Collins served on the War College's faculty. Faculty duty fostered a climate of intellectual curiosity that encouraged these officers to think through many hard problems of war beforehand. All of these officers went on to high command; their superb preparation of and impact on the generation of officers who fought in WWII and Korea cannot be overstated. Additionally, institutional commitment to education during the interwar period produced a crop of officers open to innovation. The Army must adjust assignment policies to encourage a new crop of talented officers to seek out faculty duty without fear that their career will suffer. The Army's transformation campaign recognizes the importance of education; it must now back that recognition with resources and an appreciation of contributions that the educators make in preparing leaders for battlefield success.⁵¹

The Army should open up more opportunities for qualified officers to spend a year of residency at a civilian graduate school. Although technical specialists will always be needed, the Army should direct more officers toward subjects in the humanities and social sciences. A broad liberal arts education provides officers with greater depth of intellectual insights into the human factors prevalent in war. Liberal arts curriculums also develop critical cognitive skills – analysis, synthesis, and comprehension – that equip officers to deal with war's ambiguities and non-linearity. Officer students would also have a chance to evaluate emerging civilian technologies that may have future military uses. Because the Army will routinely operate as part of coalition, officers should learn a language to enhance their communication skills. Besides having the time to reflect free from the distractions and frenzied pace of a unit, officers attending graduate school will reconnect with the American people and expand their understanding of civilian society.⁵²

Individual self-study will always remain a critical component of officer education. Officers can effectively use a variety of computer simulations, including some commercial games, to hone their individual tactical decision-making. The Army should continue to improve

its distance learning capabilities and create web-based professional development courses for individual self-improvement. But short of actual combat experience, a thorough grounding in history and leadership remain essential for understanding war. Officers' can also gain some perspective on their institution's traditions and corporate spirit through well-structured individual reading programs. The Chief of Staff's reading list provides a good start. However, the list contains only one small primer on Army history, aimed primarily at cadets. The Chief's reading list should include other books on the Army's institutional history and incorporate these works into CGSC-level and above PME curriculums. Books such as Millett and Maslowski's *For a Common Defense*, Weigley's *History of the US Army*, or the collected essays in Hagan's *Against All Enemies* highlight not only the Army's achievements in war and peace, but also the institution's recurring struggles over manning, strategy, organization, and reserve issues. Many of these themes resonate today, and a little perspective might help in addressing them realistically.

Besides educational development, the Army should review career patterns and mandatory retirement gates with a view toward extending the service tour length of career officers. OPMS XXI has redefined career tracks in anticipation of the special needs of the Information Age. Time will tell whether the system is effective, but two issues need further study. First, the nature of OPMS XXI has, perhaps unwitting, reintroduced a form of the line versus staff antagonism that affected the officer corps through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵³ At issue is the value of command to the institution and individual officers. If the technological view of warfare in fact prevails, then individual specialists of violence, the information warriors, will displace unit commanders of as the new elites having the most desirable career path.⁵⁴ This would likely result in the most talented officers moving to those branches rather than leading units. Therefore emphasis on technical specialization for high-tech network-centric warfare may hurt recruiting efforts for the combat leaders charged to fight the full spectrum of operations. Thus, the Army will need to monitor and continually rebalance requirements between various career tracks to ensure the best distribution of talented officers.

A second point needing further study is whether the current career length remains germane in the Twenty-first century. Congress fashioned the current career during the Cold War. Improved nutrition, better health-care practices, and emphasis on physical fitness have increased the general health and life span of the officer population. The increasingly complexity and technical nature of the profession of arms requires more time to master all required skills. The officer corps is hard-pressed to understand, much less master, the requirements associated with branch qualification, joint service, high level staff duty, unit command, and service as an

active duty adviser to the reserve components assignments. Extending the career span to 30 or more years would take advantage of greater longevity and provide more time to comprehend the expanding range of professional skills.

To establish a common outlook for the future direction of the officer corps, the Chief of Staff should release a White Paper on professionalism. The Army released a similar paper in 1985 titled "The Professional Development of Officers Study." Like that document, the Chief's White Paper should stress the special attributes of officership, especially the mastery of the art and science of war and the development of the warrior spirit as its principle themes. The 1985 definition of the warrior spirit has applicability today:

Officers accept the responsibility of being entrusted with the protection of the Nation; are prepared physically and mentally to lead units to fight and support in combat; [are] skilled in the use of weapons, tactics, and doctrine; inspire confidence and eagerness to be part of a team; have the ability to analyze, the vision to see, and the integrity to choose, and the courage to execute.⁵⁵

The Chief's White Paper should emphasize the nation's special trust and confidence in the officer corps. In this vein, the document should discuss what the nation expects from Army officers, their roles and responsibilities in democratic society, standards of conduct and ethical behavior. The bounds of acceptable involvement in policy making are also in need of strict clarification. Amplification of this point is necessary because there is, as Eliot Cohen has observed, "a fine but essential distinction between political literacy – vital for an officer engaged in the complex tasks of peacekeeping or armed diplomacy – and politicization."⁵⁶ Following publication, distribution, and posting on the Army home page, the chain of command should discuss the pamphlet's contents with the officer corps using a chain teaching program. This method, effectively used for other important matters, will ensure the entire officer corps understands the pamphlet's message. Even with today's busy schedules, a dialogue about officership and the profession of arms is certainly time well spent.

The scope of officer professionalism in the new century must expand its area of martial expertise, renew its corporate spirit, and develop political savvy to meet America's evolving security needs. As it moves into the Twenty- first century, the officer corps must address sweeping changes occurring in both its internal and external operating environments. The officer corps needs more thorough intellectual grounding to prepare effectively for war and carry out the broader range of missions of America's engagement strategy. The importance of intellectual preparation cannot be overstated. As General Peter J. Schoomaker, Commander of Special Operations Command, succinctly put it to his command, "warriors must be proficient in

core competencies, *training for certainty, but educating for uncertainty.*" (Italics in original)⁵⁷ Officers must develop a more diverse range of interpersonal skills to lead a new generation of soldiers but also to interact effectively with allies or host nation forces. Because of the blurring of civilian and military roles, officers must be attuned to the political dimensions of military issues and be able to articulate well-reasoned professional views on those subjects. Above all the officer corps must reinforce the essence of its military culture – psychological and physical preparation to kill the enemy through organized force – while loyally performing other missions as servants of the American public.

The officer corps must become the new military progressives and lead efforts to transform the Army for the new century. The uncertainty of the new world order demands an officer corps that is well educated and capable of adapting the military instrument to a wide variety of potential uses. Military leaders will likely find themselves giving advice not only on the application of force in combat situations but also in a peacetime environment fraught with ambiguity. Besides military options, officers will increasingly have to consider alternatives designed around the other instruments of power. Indeed, the CINCs' theater engagement plans and the operational products produced within the joint operation planning and execution system (JOPES) already furnish such details.⁵⁸ Thus, in making recommendations to policy makers, military leaders must avoid narrow professionalism and embrace a "fusionist" perspective that heeds the effects and consequences of political, economic, and technological factors. Measured in terms of its contributions to military expertise and enhanced responsibility to the state, the fusionist approach best prepares the officer corps to perform its duties as combat leaders, military statesmen, innovators, and teachers in the Twenty-first century.

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ENDNOTES

¹ William T. Sherman, quoted in Jerry M. Cooper, "The Army's Search For a Mission," in *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present* ed. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986), 182.

² Captain Carl Reichman, "In Pace Para Bellum," *Infantry Journal* II (January 1906), 5 quoted in James L. Abrahamson, *America Arms For the New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power* (New York: Free Press, 1981), 63.

³ The professionalization of the officer corps during the Progressive period set the intellectual foundations for the modern Army. Intellectual change preceded many of the actual physical changes to the Army described above. On the crucial military developments in the Progressive Period see: Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 265-354; Allan R. Millett, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army 1881-1925* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); James L. Abrahamson, *America Arms for a New Century*; Peter Karsten, "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the American Century," in *The Military in America From the Colonial Era to the Present* Revised Edition Ed. Peter Karsten (New York: Free Press, 1986): 239-274. Jerry M. Cooper's, William R. Roberts', and Timothy Nenninger's essays in *Against All Enemies Interpretations in American Military History from Colonial Times to Present*, 173-234 are excellent.

⁴ Warrant and non-commissioned officers are also accorded professional status under the Army's larger institutional umbrella. However, this essay focuses on commissioned officers because of their institutional responsibilities as senior leaders, strategy makers, and agents of change.

⁵ On the characteristics of military professionalism see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), 7-18; Allan R. Millett, "Military Professionalism and Officership in America," Mershon Center Briefing Paper (Ohio State University, 1975): 2-7; Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-first century: War, Peace and Politics* (London: Franck Cass, 1999), 19-30.

⁶ For further discussions of organizational culture see: Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," *Orbis* (Winter 1999): 11-26 and Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 27-32.

⁷ Other useful insights on military culture include Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" *Orbis* (Winter 1999): 27-42 and idem, "Military Culture Does Matter," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1999): 32-40; John Hillen, "Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?" *Orbis* (Winter 1999): 43-67.

⁸ Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (New York: MacMillian, 1983), 202.

⁹ On the factors that influence strategy-making and the development of a strategic culture see Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Berstein, eds., *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-23; Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 129-151.

¹⁰ The military provisions of Constitution of the United States of America's are in the Preamble, Article I, Section 8, and Article II, Section 2.

¹¹ On these points see Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States* (New York: Free Press, 1984), especially Chapters 1-4; Robert E. Osgood, "The American Approach to War," in *US National Security: A Framework for Analysis* ed. Daniel J. Kaufman et. al. (Lexington, MS: D.C. Heath, 1985), 91-106; Thomas S. Langston, "The Civilian Side of Military Culture," *Parameters* (Autumn 2000): 21-29.

¹² On these and other assumptions that underpin the American Way of War see Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973); F.G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), especially 1-18, 99-133; John Shy, "American Military Experience: History and Learning," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 1 (1971): 205-228.

¹³ In his sociological study of military professionalism, Morris Janowitz distinguished between absolutists and pragmatists. Absolutists are those officers who prefer total victory and minimal civilian interference in matters relating to war. Pragmatists are more concerned with measured application of force and its political outcomes. See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1970), 264-279, 305-320.

¹⁴ For an insightful analysis of the impact of total war and the nuclear age on American military professionalism see Andrew Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," *Wilson Quarterly* (Winter 1995): 51-63.

¹⁵ See James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (Washington: Brassey's, 1995).

¹⁶ Andrew Bacevich, "New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism," *Parameters* (December 1990): 14.

¹⁷ For a discussion of the fusionist model of officer professionalism see Huntington, *The Soldier and State*, 350-354, 430, 459-460; Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, especially 417-442; Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, and Lawrence J. Korb, *American National Security: Policy and Process* 3d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), 173-178.

¹⁸ Distribution of "values" cards and institutionalization of quarterly Consideration of Others classes are two examples of the Army's indoctrination efforts to make the command climate more inclusive and instill character in its membership.

¹⁹ For various descriptions of post-modern culture and its juxtaposition with military culture see Charles C. Moskos, John a. Williams, and David R. Segal, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Stephanie Gutmann, *The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can America's Gender-neutral Fighting Forces Still Win Wars?* (New York: Scribner, 2000); Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the*

Officer Corps (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000); Thomas S. Langston, "The Civilian Side of Military Culture," *Parameters* 30 (Autumn 2000): 21-29; and Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," *Orbis* (Winter 1999): 11-26 and "America's Postmodern Military," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 2000): 47-54.

²⁰ For a brief sampling of views on the RMA see Clifford J. Rogers ed., *The Military Revolution Debate* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* (Fall 1994): 30-42; Eliot A. Cohen, "Come the Revolution," *National Review* 47/14 (31 July 1995), 26-30 and "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75/2 (March/April 1996): 37-54; Joseph Nye and William Owens, "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs* 75/2 (March/April 1996): 21-36; and A. J. Bacevich, "Preserving the Well-bred Horse," *The National Interest* (Fall 94): 23-40.

²¹ On various aspects of warfare described below see MG Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Future Warfare Anthology* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999). Also see Steven Metz, "The American Army in the 21st Century," *Strategic Review* (Fall 1999): 12-17.

²² Thomas G. Mahnken, "War and Culture in the Information Age," *Strategic Review* (Winter 2000): 41.

²³ At this writing the controversial advertising campaign has just begun. On its meaning, intended audience, and reasons for controversy see Jane McHugh, "An Army of One: Soldiers Hate It, Teens Like It, What's Next?" and idem, "It's Working: "Army of One" is Getting Attention from Target Group" and Matthew Cox, "PlayStation Generation 'Gets' New Slogan," *Army Times* (February 5, 2001): 14-16, 18.

²⁴ Vietnam has produced an enormous body of literature from both military and civilian writers. This includes the writings of many key decision-makers. However, the Army shifted its institutional focus after the war from counterinsurgency operations and search and destroy missions to conventional war scenarios with the Soviet Union. Other than Harry G. Summers, Jr.'s *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982), written for the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, the Army as an institution quickly abandoned serious study of the war. The war deserves much more critical study within the officer corps for two reasons: first, because of its enormous cultural impact on the profession even today; and second, it provides potential opponents with a model to wage a successful war against a first class, high-tech power. The following paragraph will explore this thought further. For other important critiques of the Army in Vietnam see Andrew Krepenevich, *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) and Sam C. Sarkesian, *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 75-111.

²⁵ On the real dangers and difficulties for the Western powers to fight irregular warfare in the locations listed see, Anatol Lieven, "Nasty Little Wars," *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01): 65-76.

²⁶ The difficulty of assessing the overall nature of the war and developing effective counter-strategies is a recurrent theme of the conflict. The Objective Force will likely face opponents who will fight both symmetrically and asymmetrically as the situation dictates, just as the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong did. For brief recounting on the difficulties of developing counter-strategies and fighting in Vietnam's complex environment see George V. Herring, "American Strategy in Vietnam: The Postwar Debate," *Military Affairs* 46 (April 1982): 57-63; LTG Philip B.

Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988): 333-369, 387-424. Also see Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture in Small Wars," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 3/3 (winter 1992): 205-216.

²⁷ This term refers to the range of operations – offense, defense, stability, and support – the Army performs in war, smaller scale contingencies, or peacetime engagement environments. See US Army Command and General Staff College, Student Text 3.0 *Operations* (Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, 2000), 1-14-1-17.

²⁸ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991).

²⁹ William J. Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).

³⁰ See for example Gregory D. Foster, "The Effect of Deterrence on the Fighting Ethic," *Armed Forces and Society* 10/2 (Winter 1984): 276-292; David R. Segal and Barbara Foley Meeker, "Peacekeeping, Warfighting, and Professionalism: Attitude, Organization and Change Among Combat Soldiers on Constabulary Duty," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 13 (Fall 1985): 167-181; David R. Segal and Ronald B. Tiggle, "Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post-Cold War World," *Armed Forces and Society* 23/3 (Spring 1997): 373-390; David R. Segal, Brian J. Reed, and David E. Rohall, "Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the US Army," *Armed Forces and Society* 24/4 (Summer 1998): 535-548; and Volker C. Franke, "Warriors for Peace: The Next Generation of US Military Leaders," *Armed Forces and Society* 24/1 (fall 1997): 33-57.

³¹ Unnamed officer quoted in Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, *Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 1.

³² While debating Bosnia policy, Madeline Albright, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, asked what the point in having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" On the exchange see Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 576-577.

³³ Dana Priest, "A Four Star Foreign Policy?" *Washington Post*, September 28, 2000, A1; idem, "An Engagement in 10 Time Zones," *Washington Post* September 29, 2000, A1; and "Standing Up to State and Congress," *Washington Post*, September 30, 2000, A1.

³⁴ See Forrest C. Pogue, "George C. Marshall on Civil Relations in the United States," in *The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University, 1991), 193-222.

³⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 345-373; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: Free Press, 1984), Chapters 15-17.

³⁶ Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest* (Spring 1994): 3-17.

³⁷ Michael R. Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Military Force in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 28 September 1992, Sec A, 1, cols 4-5; 5, cols. 1-2; General Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, 8 October 1992, Sec A, 35, cols. 1-4, A47.

³⁸ Editor, "Our 'No Can Do' Military," *New York Times*, 4 October 1992, Sec. 4, cols. 1-2; Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *The Journal of Military History* Special Issue 57 (October 1993): 27-58.

³⁹ Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," 3. For more on the civil-military crisis see Colin Powell, John Lehman, William Odom, Samuel Huntington, and Richard Kohn, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest* (Summer 1994): 23-31; Thomas E. Ricks, "Is American Professionalism Declining?" *Proceedings* (July 1998): 26-29; William Pfaff, "The Praetorian Guard," *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01): 57-64; A.J. Bacevich, "Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 76-79; Mackubin T. Owens, "Civilian Control: A National Crisis?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 80-83.

⁴⁰ This also provided a mechanism for civilian oversight of the military. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* ed Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 609-610.

⁴¹ For perspectives on the role and training of military strategists see: John R. Galvin, "What's the Matter with Being a Strategist?" *Parameters* (March 1989): 2-10; Major General Gerald P. Stadler, "A Shortage of Strategists," *Army History* 16 (Fall 1990): 1, 3.

⁴² Maxwell Taylor quoted in Jordan et. al., *American National Security*, 175

⁴³ Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds. *Military Effectiveness*, Volume I (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 4-6.

⁴⁴ For a discussion of the terms and concepts see Sam Sarkesian, "The US Military Must Find Its Voice," *Orbis* (Summer 1998): 423-435; Sam Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-first century*, 159-169.

⁴⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 99-100; 731-732.

⁴⁶ Colin Powell quoted in Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 155.

⁴⁷ Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and their Mutual Misunderstandings," *The National Interest* (Fall 2000): 34, 36. For further discussion of civil-military issues see Eliot Cohen, "Why the Gap Matters," *The National Interest* (Fall 2000): 38-48; and Edward N. Luttwak, "From Vietnam to Desert Fox: Civil-Military Relations in Modern Democracies," *Survival* 41 No. 1 (Spring 1999): 99-112.

⁴⁸ Douglas MacArthur to Massachusetts legislature quoted in Sir John Hackett, "The Military in the Service of the State," in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* 2nd edition Malham M. Wakin ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 114-115. Roy K. Flint, "The Truman-MacArthur

Conflict: Dilemmas in Civil-Military Relations in the Nuclear Age," *The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States*, 223-267is excellent on the related issues. For a brief but excellent discussion of the ethical issues discussed below see Paul Christopher, "Unjust War and Moral Obligation: What Should Officers Do?" *Parameters* (Autumn 1995): 4-8.

⁴⁹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 83-84.

⁵⁰ Feaver and Kohn, "The Gap, " 36-37.

⁵¹ On the importance of instructor assignments to the intellectual development of the officers corps and for ideas on future PME see Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996); Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computers In Military Culture and Technological Hubris," *The National Interest* 48 (Summer 1997): 57-64; Leonard D. Holder, Jr. and Williamson Murray, "Prospects for Military Education," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 81-90.

⁵² On the value of civilian graduate school see Sarkesian, *Beyond the Battlefield*, 164-193; Richard H. Kohn, "An Officer Corps for the Next Century," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 76-80; Robert A. Vitas, "Civilian Graduate Education and the Professional Officer," Available from <http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/MayJun99/Vitas.htm>. Internet; accessed 9 November 2000.

⁵³ Prior to 1903, autonomous staff bureaus set policy and administered the Army. Officers often sought out service on a bureau staff because it brought faster promotion and greater prestige. Frustrated by their own lack of control over the institution, the Army's regimental officers resented the power of the bureaus. In the context of this paper the staff-line controversy refers to the potential for friction between traditional combat and command-related branch officers and competing career fields, such as information operations, especially if they are accorded equal or greater status without actual service in the field.

⁵⁴ Stephen Rosen argues that peacetime innovation is possible when "senior officers with traditional credentials . . . create a new promotion pathway for junior officers practicing the new way of warfare." Some of these "new warfare" officers will eventually rise to the top ranks of their institutions. He points to naval aviators and submariners as two examples of this trend. Within the US Army, these pathways are both formal and informal. The creation of the Army's Aviation branch founded on the use of helicopters is an example of a formal career path. Paratrooper duty in one of the airborne divisions created an informal, if recognized, path to higher responsibilities within the Infantry branch during the 1950's. See Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1991), 127.

⁵⁵ Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-888, *Commanders Call, Special Issue, The Professional Development of Officers Study* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Army, Public Affairs, May-June 1985), 5. For a discussion of the essential attributes of the warrior spirit see John C. Bahnsen and Robert W. Cone, "Defining the American Warrior Leader," *Parameters* (December 1990): 24-28.

⁵⁶ Cohen, "Why the Gap Matters," 47.

⁵⁷ General Peter J. Schoomaker, *Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead* (Tampa: US Special Forces Command, 2000).

⁵⁸ Armed Forces' Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), Chapter 6 explains the JOPES system.

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